Agrofuels are increasingly sourced and sold as a socially and environmentally beneficial solution to oil dependence. The promotion of sugar-derived ethanol as a substitute for petroleum has thus been key to state development and international trade policies by Brazil and EU respectively and subsequent investment by leading energy and food transnational corporations has transformed socio-spatial relations in the new sites of production. Brazilian rural worker testimonies, however, point to large scale labour exclusion rather than reform and a deepening, rather than disruption, of historic power inequalities in the sector. Labour contestation challenges a converging institutional discourse of responsible technological innovation and social upgrading associated with emerging commodity chains and the 'green' economy. Although corporate and statutory response has been market-orientated certification and 'more technology' the idea of the 'techno-institutional fix' provides a power relationattentive analysis that invites the further exploration of socially committed alternatives to food and energy production.
Introduction
In the wake of the global financial crisis, policy concerns regarding resource security are accompanied by changing relations between states and (global) markets and corporations. Peak oil horizons and transnational mandates for reducing the rate of greenhouse gas emissions have coaxed governments and private corporations to pursue sources and markets for new energy forms. At the same time, energy and mineral extraction are strongly linked to current and prospective state developmental strategies amongst emerging nation-states. New models of state-capital relations in, for example, Brazil and China, are also thereby gaining greater influence over global political economic trends and norms. This is true also in the pivotal socio-economic arena of technological 'innovation' that has been given an elevated role as key both to resolving the current challenges (of economic growth, climate change, resource security) and to the continuation of national development projects.
The promotion of high-end technologies linked to 'sustainable development', lower carbon outputs and hence the 'green' economy reflect an institutional aspiration that further economic growth (or socioeconomic development more broadly) does not simply exacerbate other problems, such as pollution and climate change. In addition, issues of work and employment were, for the first time, formally incorporated into the climate agreements at the Rio+20 UN Conference. There is, therefore, a new transnational emphasis upon 'green' innovation being 'responsible' in vaguely specified ways: protecting the environment and upgrading marginalised land, providing development and decent work in rural areas and assisting towards poverty eradication (EC, 2009; ILO and UNEP, 2012 ).
In the European Union's turn to the southern hemisphere to source the biomass required to meet Kyoto renewable fuel targets, nowhere has this emphasis been more evident than in the institutional discourses promoting the emerging global commodity chain for ethanol as a substitute for fossil fuel (Franco et al., 2010) . Boasting the world's first integrated energy matrix and a world leader in sugar-derived ethanol production, the Brazilian government's enthusiasm for agrofuel has been paralleled by global organisations promoting business, jobs, the environment, trade and development (EC, 2009; IEA, 2011; ILO and UNEP, 2012) .
Research objectives
Against the backdrop of a threefold increase in international investment in Brazil's ethanol sector, a reconfiguration of social and spatial relations and subsequent market concentration by transnational oil and food majors, this paper questions the converging institutional discourse of responsible technological innovation and social upgrading associated with the emerging commodity chain for ethanol. By taking a more systemic and power-relation-attentive analysis of the sectors' development, the study asks firstly, (i) how do systematic blind spots in even sophisticated theoretical perspectives concerned with technological change and global commodity chains risk making invisible the reproduction of highly unequal power relations in locales of biofuel production with significant implications regarding the actual (social) 'responsibility' and how work is organised and experienced? Secondly, by turning specifically to capital, state and labour relations in the modern history of the ethanol sector, the study considers the familiar but crucial role that innovation and technology play under capitalism in transgressing challenges to profit accumulation presented by labour (e.g. Burawoy, 1979; Braverman, 1998; Harvey, 2014: ch.8 ) and questions, (ii) how does a new technological and institutional 'fix' for agrofuels represent a continuation (rather than a disruption) of market, territorial, wealth and power concentration by oil majors, albeit through a diversification into non fossil fuels? Thirdly, In light of specific worker contestation within the emerging ethanol commodity chain and the massive exclusion of Brazilian rural labour in particular, the paper outlines the corporate response by the 'new bosses' to social and environmental concerns through market certification and more technology the paper and explores (iv) how are powerful corporations with increasing control over leading technologies reworking state-capital relations, requiring new techno-institutional fixes amidst market and political instability?
Finally we highlight how, despite growing power asymmetries between capital and labour, social innovations by rural workers protesting the hegemonic model of monoculture are embracing modern technology in these regions of production. In doing so they offer a disruption to incumbent models of agrofuel production and invite further investigation of socially as well as ecologically committed alternatives.
In what follows, the recent theoretical developments in relation to two key concepts that underpin this study are considered, namely techno-institutional lock-in (Unruh, 2002) and global commodity chains (GCCs) (e.g. Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994) but where both of these are read through a lens attentive to power relations and the 'ecologically dominant' systemic logic of the inherent challenges of regularizing capital accumulation on an everexpanding global scale (see e.g. Porto-Gonçalves, 2006; Selwyn, 2013; Jessop, 2014; Tyfield, 2014) . Attention is then drawn to the systemic structures within which path-dependent technologies, corporations, the state and labour have developed and are embedded. Following an overview of the research methods, the idea of a techno-institutional (and socio-political) 'fix' is explored in the subsequent analysis of morphing state, capital and labour relations in Brazil's ethanol sector over time. The experiences, struggles and perspectives of rural workers provide the prism through which the contemporary, contested concentration of technology, territory and power in the specific sites of production is interpreted, linked both to global techno-institutional systems of energy production and consumption and to international finance and markets. Finally, a contrasting paradigm of agricultural production of food with energy is presented, reflecting the contemporary struggles of rural workers and their collective organisations for resource distribution and alternate visions of work and production.
Theoretical considerations
In seeking to relate concrete empirical evidence concerning agroindustrial working conditions in Brazilian biofuel production to the broader issues of transforming systems and structures of energy production and consumption and (global) political economy, this paper turns to and modifies two theoretical literatures. These address two key aspects of contemporary biofuel production, namely the technological and institutional aspects of energy systems and the interweaving of biofuel production in globally-spanning networks. Yet in each case, the dominant literatures in these fields pay insufficient attention to two key elements that critical labour studies would seek to prioritize. These concern the constitutive role of technologicallymediated power relations, rather than abstract 'structures', in the dynamic formation and reproduction of such systems and commodity chains; and the pervasive and insistent presence of the logic of capital accumulation. Only by incorporating these concerns in this theoretical frame can the actual predicament, conditions and aspirations of labour be illuminated, especially the systemic empowerment of (specific fractions) of workers -may be unchanged or even deteriorating as a seemingly 'progressive' systemic changes in policy, energy and technology are taking place.
The techno-institutional lock in
A growing normative literature on the required 'transition' from high-carbon, path-dependent energy systems to a lower-carbon economic infrastructure commonly assumes an expert-led, elite process from one technological system to another, within or across benign states. While not denying the goal, Unruh (2002) critiqued this way of thinking about it by introducing the concept of 'techno-institutional lock-in' in order to highlight that system dominance of a particular technological system may continue, not necessarily as a result of superior product design, utility or quality, but by its ability to lower economic, social and psychological costs of relative to potential competitors who are 'locked-out' (Foxon, 2002) . Path dependencies, positive feedback and asymmetries of power meant dominant systems or configurations of technologies and social forms are resistant to change. These characteristics and potential for inertia are shared with institutions, the formal or informal constraints 'that human beings devise to shape human interaction' (Foxon, 2002: 2) . Indeed as a result of economies of scale, learned behaviours, established networks and infrastructures co-evolving interaction between these systems and political institutions culminates in a 'techno-institutional complex' (Unruh, 2002) .
Unruh explained that when environmental externalities such as climate change arise from locked-in systems, of which fossil fuel combustion is a prime example, favoured solutions are those that minimise change to the existing system by treating emissions or making incremental, intra-system innovations that seek 'to maintain as much similarity as possible between the existing system and the new configuration' (Unruh, 2002: 318) . This process can be observed in the transition to bioenergy. Among the many possible sources of lower carbon, 'renewable' energy, liquid biofuels have been the focus for a new techno-institutional 'fix' by successful lobbies by automobile, energy, agriculture and biotechnology corporations who have found suitable partners at the levels national and transnational governance (Franco et al., 2010) . While adding a welcome dose of social and political realism to analysis of potential low-carbon energy transitions, however, the framing of the challenge of constructing a viable biofuel energy system in terms of techno-institutional lock-in arguably has veered too far to the other extreme: one is left with the choice of either defeatist acceptance that system transition depends upon institutionalized power structures that are, ex hypothesi, against any such transition, or an entirely wilful and naïve (hence inevitably disappointed) 'hope' that change can emerge 'from outside' 'somehow'… The ['new boss'] is broadly cheered, while the 'old boss' is booed, and one is understood as succeeding entirely at the expense of the other.
By contrast, where power in such systems is understood in broadly Foucauldian terms as productive, strategic and relational, a different picture emerges without the need to repudiate the analytical dividends of the systemic perspective (Tyfield, 2014) . Here, then, the system is dynamically co-produced by and with emerging forms of power relation that are themselves in turn shaped, enabled and constrained by both the incumbent and emerging systems. And the persistent presence (and expansion) of a particularly important form of contemporary social relation, the capitalist wage form upon which the political economic regime of global capital accumulation rests, affords incorporation into the analysis historically one of the most powerful of motors for such change and the 'constant revolutionizing' of society, labour. From this perspective we may attend to how changing labour relations are fundamentally constitutive of and themselves co-produced with the emerging system 'lock-in' or 'fix'.
Global commodity chains and the techno-institutional fix
These concepts resonate with the 'spatio-temporal' fixes of capital accumulation, whether in terms of physical fixing of surpluses in order to preserve profitable investment opportunities (Harvey, 2001a) , political, socioeconomic and cultural settlements to afford continuing capital accumulation despite its inherent improbability (Jessop, 2014) or the (always temporary) 'fixing' of the various contradictions of (global) capitalism more generally (Arrighi, 2005) .
Hence, where new enclosures characterise in a vigorous global drive for minerals and grains, the 'new boss' may look very much like the 'old boss' as capital proves remarkably adept in acquiring, institutional support to ensure further profit accumulation and expansion, while 'old' capital, technology, space and labour are destroyed to make way for new developments creating new tensions, social challenges and only postpones internal crises.
The failure of techno-scientific and GCC studies to incorporate into their analysis the crisis ridden, cyclical character of capitalism, the systemic reproduction of inequality and the ability of labour to contest this in its own interest has been recently reiterated (Brewer, 2011: 321; Selwyn, 2013; Taylor et al., 2013) . That social implications of spatialised capital accumulation strategies point to a not uncommon divergence between economic and labour benefits (Harvey, 1982; Taylor et al., 2013) provides a counterpoint to the emphasis on social upgrading adopted in the literature on global commodity chains (e.g. Milberg and Winkler, 2011) and more specifically to the assumptions of the social gains from new biofuel commodity chains based on best case labour scenarios by influential international organisations (EC, 2009; ILO and UNEP, 2012; see Lerche, 2012 for a critique). Responding to the international mandates for reducing carbon emissions that followed the Kyoto Protocol, the European Commission's Renewable Energy Directive (REDD+) (2009: 1-2), for example, pertains that bioenergy markets will favour localised, decentralised producers bringing a 'positive impact on regional and local development opportunities, export prospects, social cohesion and employment opportunities, in particular as concerns SMEs and independent energy producers'. Trade in new energy forms will 'contribute significantly to sustainable development in rural areas and offer farmers new income opportunities'. In turn, the ILO and UNEP forsee that, 'Transfers such as those envisaged for REDD+ will help developing countries to create much-needed employment through investment in environmental services' (p. x), will 'enable smallholder farmers to adopt greener and more productive farming practices could boost food security, lift tens of millions out of poverty and prevent accelerated rural-urban migration' (p. ix) while the 'organization of farmers and workers is an important stepping stone to give rural communities a voice in policy-making for rural development and greening agriculture ' (p. 19) . The Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA) singled out as exemplary for 'aiming' to retrain some 7,000 cane cutters annually for a range of occupations (p. 84), and commitment to a voluntary scheme to improve labour conditions. While these particular best case scenarios will be critically reviewed in light of worker testimonies below, the assumption that workers and, in turn, their communities will make material gains from their integration and inclusion in new transnational networks of bioenergy production typify the logic of social upgrading that has gained traction in global commodity chain studies (e.g. Milberg and Winkler, 2011) .
The developmental or indeed 'modern-colonial' thrust of this assumption has brought its share of critics for ignoring how the inception and application of technological innovation carries the mark of the socially and economically powerful (Dunaway and Clelland, 1995; Smith, 1985; Porto Gonçalves, 2002; Selwyn, 2013; Howcroft and Taylor 2014) , requires credit in abundance (Arrighi et al., 2003: 18) and how corporations align technological innovation with nation state and transnational policy while their financialisation is increasingly linked to riskadverse shareholders. Crucial to understanding a techno-institutional fix, however, is that innovation cannot dispel or dissolve the inherent contradictions in the process of capital accumulation (Jessop, 2014) , including labour's capacity to disrupt the production process in pursuit of improved wages and conditions (Cumbers et al., 2008; Wright, 2000) . (In a 2007 review of global networks for biofuel by Mol, for example, labour is referenced only in relation to its low cost). Although the constitutive and conflictual role of labour is increasingly recognised in GCC studies (Cumbers et al., 2008; Selwyn, 2013; Taylor et al., 2013 ) the analysis presented here that is attentive to systemic and relational power structures in sites of commodity production requires consideration beyond the supply chain's fields and factories and to the broader and contested social relations in the frontiers (geographical, political and technological) of bioenergy production (Stewart and Garvey, forthcoming) . From this perspective it becomes possible to conceive how new forms of power relation, coalitions, institutions and power-knowledge technologies may emerge out of the incumbent system in various ways that are incompatible with its existing form and are also capable of reinforcing each other, even to the point of being able to challenge that system lock-in or 'fix'. So for our purposes, 'What are the successive and specific forms of techno-institutional fix emerging around Brazilian biofuels?' 'How do these relate to transformations in the power relations and politics of labour?' What alternatives are being presented by rural workers, the very subjects to have most benefited from new biofuel trade, demanding social, policy and technological innovation?' These questions are returned to following an overview of the research methods.
Field work in Brazil
Field work was carried out over a 26 month contiguous period in the municipalities of Assis, Agroindustry. Brazilian companies have historically had a strong command over research and development and the four key nodes of the supply chain which begins with the agricultural preparation, cultivation and harvesting of sugar cane from an area of at least 30,000 hectares, its transport (normally of distances up to 70km) to the mills/distilleries where sugar, ethanol and gas are produced and then its distribution to national networks and eastern ports. Workers involved in the agricultural divisions of labour were the focus of the fieldwork and one-to-one and focus group interviews were conducted with 64 workers currently and seasonally employed in manual and mechanised sugar cane planting, maintenance, harvesting and pesticide application. Twelve one-to-one interviews with now redundant manual workers were conducted across the camps of six land occupations and in the poor housing areas on the 
Brazil and an emerging commodity chain for agroenergy Labour and the old bosses
The memories of manual cane cutting in four São Paulo plantations in the 1980s shared by Pedro, Carlos, Sandra and Diogo are vivid. But then, childhood recollections often are. Sandra was 12 when she had shyly confessed to her mother how little sugar cane she had cut on her first of many days in the cane fields of Maracaí. Diogo was 15 when he was hidden amidst the tall stands of cane grass in the NovAmérica, Tarumá, when the authorities visited. For Pedro and Carlos, their young age was the norm on the plantations; school was something to be done in the evenings, or later in life. Pedro was 13 when he joined his father in the NovAmérica plantation at Tarumá in 1983. He could recall little of the strike, three years later, when 2,300 cane cutters put down their machetes in the same plantation. Their work stoppage had opposed the "colonial style" management on the plantations and followed significant strikes in 1984 and 1985 elsewhere in São Paulo state as sugar cane cutters sought to exert greater control over their productivity, income, transport and work conditions. These were years of the military government's post-oil crisis ProAlcohol programme (1975 ProAlcohol programme ( -1990 during which an agroindustrial elite had been subsidised to adapt sugar producing technologies to the production of By the 1990s, 390,000 workers (of a total workforce of around 600,000) were contracted, most often through third party agents, into the São Paulo cane fields. For seasonally employed migrant workers who returned annually to underemployment or subsistence agriculture in their distant homes the pressure to augment poor wages and earn an annual wage from the seven month harvest season meant manual productivity increased demonstrably by the insertion of these workers into the cane fields (Alves, 2006) . The shortening of breaks and lengthening of working days were, and continue to be, accommodated by employers (Thomaz Junior, 2002; Garvey and Barreto, forthcoming), while scandalous, indentured working and living conditions of subcontracted migrant workers that made labour organisation so difficult have been well documented, implicating large producers such as Brenco, Cosan and Luis Dreyfuss (Reporter Brasil, 2011) .
In the view of the rural labourers, the second device introduced to compromise their organisational capacity that had taken everyone, including the trade unions, by surprise in the 1980s was in intensified mechanisation of sugarcane planting and harvesting. One harvester replaces 80 to 100 workers and, in contrast the undulating northeast of the country, the flat terrain of São Paulo state's interior proved suitable to their operation. NovAmérica wheeled in the harvesting machines in the 1990s, beginning an annual cull of round 10% of the workforce, meaning the stronger, faster, least troublesome stood the best chance of being selected for the following year's harvest (interview, Dani, May 2013) and leading to a staggering intensification of work. Whereas cane-cutters were cutting on average 5-8 tonnes per day in 1980 (and indeed in the days of slavery), a tally of 18-20 tonnes per day among the remaining cutters is not uncommon at present, while mechanisation has, in their view, limited their ability to protest historic superexploitation: "We struck before, various times. Sometimes we got something, other times nothing, but now with machines they say they just don't need you" (Pedro, 2013).
Labour and the new bosses: entry of the energy majors
The sector was rejuvenated in 2003 after newly elected President Lula da Silva embraced both the large internal market and home-grown technological innovation, promoting the production and consumption of 'flexi-fuel' vehicles (FFVs) that could run on petrol or low carbon emitting It became apparent in the early 21 st century, however, not least from the deaths through overwork of 14 young, male cane cutters in just two seasons in the heartlands of the modernising industry for renewable energy production, workers were becoming less able to reproduce their own labour under the conditions that were being set by the leading companies (Alves, 2006) . A historic disregard for worker rights was again displayed as workers protesting 162 guests from 82 countries, concerns over labour conditions were raised (Chaddad, 2010) .
The new techno-institutional fix
More flexibility, more technology, no more Mr Nice Guy
The response by leading companies in the sector, now more than 50% controlled by foreign capital, to pressure for improved work conditions, debates over food versus energy production and market instability have been large scale labour exclusion, credit capture for more technology in line with international policy reform, the promotion of voluntary and market orientated certification in place of more rigorous labour protection, and further pressure for restructuring existing laws for labour and land rights.
In an address to the International Energy Agency (2011), a Raizen spokesperson affirmed,
As a large company, Raizen contributes substantially to social sustainability. There is less reliance on manual labour -in the harvest of 2011/2012 more than 70% of the cane will be Perhaps inevitably these trends have been met with resistance and in Araraquara, São Paulo, close to the now legendary cane cutters strikes of the 1980s, the entire workforce in the São
Martins plant went on strike for 13 days in 2010, hence ending the variable salary and outsourcing of key tasks within the distillery and surrounding plantations. The strike was noteworthy for the success that the rural workers in the agricultural section had in convincing their counterparts in the distilleries to also strike (despite the reticence of the latters' unions), since their actions were going to halt production in any case. This was part of a broader strategy by their Federation (FERAESP) to counter corporatist labour law which entrenches geographical and occupational divisions within and across the workforce (Garvey and Barreto, forthcoming) and to centralise collective bargaining with the multinationals. Firstly, the international biofuel market has not taken off as expected, in part due to the post 2008 recession, low oil prices and the European Union amending its renewable energy mandates to cap its sourcing of renewable energy from primary biomass (e.g. from corn or raw sugar cane), requiring that 5% would come from advanced or secondary techniques (e.g.
extracted from the cellulose of leaves or woody tissue of the plant). Raizen availed of a R$1 billion credit line from Brazil's development bank and incorporated Canadian biotech firm Iogen into its growing portfolio to begin the commercialisation of cellulosic ethanol. Under this stewardship, however, production and future commercialisation of 'second generation' ethanol from 'waste' organic material is dependent on maintaining, intensifying and expanding the cultivation of the primary material, the sugar cane, from which the waste matter will be extracted. Industry estimates that a further foreign investment of R$44 billion is required for its expansion of 3.1 million hectares in sugarcane in the next four years.
As the food and energy multinationals extend their operations, product diversification and The realisation of such initiatives invites and requires sustained technical and political engagement between these communities, researchers and policy makers willing to make an analytic shift and measure the viability and longer-term contribution of farming systems across a range of biophysical, economic and social indicators while no longer taking for granted the deeply uneven, globalised socio-political systems within which key stakeholders and shareholders are currently embedded in specific nodes and regions of production.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to address blind spots in the literatures of global commodity chain analyses (e.g., Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Milberg and Winkler, 2010) and technoinstitutional lock in (Unruh, 2002) , exploring how existing loci of strategic agency across an emerging global commodity chain for ethanol (via corporations and their interconnections with the state and intra-state institutions) and, in particular the not-to-be-questioned logic of capital accumulation, privilege a momentum of 'socio-technical system change' that is effectively 'everything changing so that everything may remain the same'. While marketed as part of a 'responsible' transition to a lower-carbon economy (e.g. EC 2009; ILO and UNEP, 2012), hitech innovation is aligned with new alliances between energy and food corporations and state and intra-state institutions, policies and investment strategies. Not only are incumbent energy infrastructures (and south-to-north primary commodity flows) kept intact by the new alliances but, by presenting the reconfiguration of social and spatial relations through the prism of worker experiences, it has been demonstrated how increasing corporate market and territorial control have deepened conditions for power asymmetries between labour and employers.
'More' technology and market-orientated, voluntary certification has proved inadequate in addressing the distinct, social challenges emerging from this transition. It is suggested that this is indicative of how a morphing techno-institutional fix for agrofuel struggles to contain inherent contradictions the increasingly capital-intensive model of large plantation-scale monoculture, contested most loudly by the very rural labourers that agrofuel innovation was proclaimed to benefit. In conclusion, by adopting the theoretical break of conceiving technoinstitutional fixes in terms of dynamic and co-produced power relations, a greater empirical attention to socially committed alternatives is made possible and actively invited by the action and practices of these workers. In this way, critical labour research of techno-institutional change may help unlock further possibilities for ecologically sensitive food and fuel production and socially committed societies that they could help constitute.
